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ABSTRACT
This paper utilizes a micro-level data set from 49 countries to address three issues: What
determines corruption at the individual level? What determines the perception of the extent of
corruption in the country? Does corruption have a direct impact on growth when the quality of the
institutions are controlled for? In addition, the paper creates a direct measure of corruption which
portrays the extent of corruption as revealed byindividuals who live in those countries. 
The results show that both personal and country characteristics determine the risk of
exposure to bribery. Examples are gender, wealth, education, marital status, the city size, the legal
origin of the country, the existence of uninterrupted democracy, a war between 1960s and 1980s,
and the strength of the institutions in the country (measured by the risk of expropriation). 
The second part of the paper shows that controlling for endogeneity of corruption and
institutional quality, actual corruption in the country and the proportion of the bribes asked by
various government agencies have no direct impact on corruption perception. On the other hand, an
improvement in the quality of institutions lowers the perception of corruption. 
The final section of the paper shows that controlling for the quality of the institutions,
corruption does not have a direct impact on growth. Keeping constant the geographical location of
the country, the legal origin, religious composition, the presence of a war, the federal status, initial
education and income as well as the extent of corruption in the country, a one-half standard
deviation increase in the quality of institutions (e.g. from the level of Indonesia to the level of India),












  WHAT DETERMINES CORRUPTION? 
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA 
 
I.  Introduction 
Because an increase in perceived corruption in a country is thought to be associated with 
a slower rate of economic growth (Mauro 1995), a sizable literature has emerged recently to 
examine factors that impact the level of corruption across countries.  For example, Ades and Di 
Tella (1999) found that corruption is higher in countries where domestic firms are sheltered from 
foreign competition.  Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) documented the relationship between a 
country’s economic freedom and its level of corruption.   Brunetti and Weder (2003) found that a 
higher freedom of the press is associated with less corruption.   Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(2001) showed that the higher the ratio of government wages to manufacturing wages, the lower 
is corruption in a country.
1     
The current research on corruption has two common characteristics.  First, it exclusively 
relies on subjective measures of corruption.  Specifically, it employs various indexes of 
corruption perception, based on the surveys of international business people, expatriates, risk 
analysts, and local residents.  The use of a corruption perception index is justified because the 
actual level of corruption in a country is difficult to observe.  Certain potential measures of 
corruption, such as the number of prosecuted corruption-related cases in a country, may be rather 
noisy measures.  For example, a low arrest rate for bribery may indicate a low prevalence of 
corruption or it may indicate wide-spread corruption with no prevention efforts.  
Second, because corruption data are available only at the aggregate (country) level, 
existing research has focused on explaining the cross-country variation in corruption.  Two 
                                                           





 exceptions are Swamy et al. (2001) and Svensson (2003).  Swamy et al. (2001) used micro data 
where respondents answered questions on hypothetical situations regarding corruption.  In the 
same paper, they analyzed the responses of 350 managers from the former Soviet Republic of 
Georgia to a question on the frequency of an official requesting unofficial payments.  Svensson 
(2003) analyzed the bribery behavior of 176 firms in Uganda. 
This paper analyzes information obtained from over 90,000 individuals from 49 countries 
pertaining to their direct experiences with corruption.  Specifically, the individuals are asked 
whether any government official such as a government worker, police officer, or inspector in that 
country has asked them or expected them to pay a bribe for his services during the previous year.  
Using these micro data the paper looks at four issues.  First, it investigates the determinants of 
the probability of being asked for a bribe.  Following the theoretical arguments put forth by 
Treisman (2002), this probability is explained by a number of country characteristics.  In 
addition, personal characteristics of the individuals are controlled for as they are expected to 
impact the exposure to corruption through the mechanisms discussed in Section II below.  The 
results show that the characteristics of an individual influence his/her propensity of exposure to 
bribery.  For example, males, individuals with higher income and education are more likely to be 
asked for a bribe.  Country characteristics also influence exposure to bribery.  For example, an 
increase in the quality of the institutions in the country and the existence of uninterrupted 
democracy are associated with reduced corruption propensity.   
Second, using these micro data, an aggregate (country level) corruption index is created, 
which is the weighted proportion of individuals who were asked for a bribe in the country.   This 
index is a direct indicator of the breadth of corruption.  Put differently, it measures how wide-





 corruption perception indices generated by Transparency International, World Bank, Business 
International and International Country Risk Guide.   
  Third, exploiting the detail of the micro data, the proportion of bribes asked for by 
various players, such as government officials, police officers, customs’ officers, inspectors and 
other officials is calculated.   The relationship between corruption perception indexes and these 
various sources of corruption is analyzed, which demonstrates that the extent of corruption in 
government offices and the police have significant impacts on perceived corruption about the 
country.    However, when the quality of the institutions (measured by the risk of expropriation) 
in the country is controlled for, the association between actual corruption in the country and the 
corruption perception about the country disappears.  Instead, the quality of institutions are 
significant determinants of corruption perception about the country.   
Finally, the paper shows that for the countries in this data set, per capita income growth 
between 1975 and 1995 is influenced by the quality of the institutions of the country; but keeping 
constant the quality of the institutions, the extent of corruption does not exert a statistically 
significant impact on economic growth.  This result is in contrast to earlier studies which 
suggested the existence of a direct negative impact of corruption on economic development. 
 
II.  What Determines Corruption? Theoretical Considerations 
Macro-level 
Treisman (2000) details a number of hypotheses that link the level of corruption in the 
country to its legal, political and socio-economic characteristics.  Following his discussion and 
the literature he cites, it is postulated that at the macro level the following holds: 





 where the extent of corruption in country j (CORj) depends on Legal (L) and Cultural (C) 
attributes of the country, as well as the level of economic development of the country (Econ).  
Economic development, on the other hand, is argued to be negatively impacted by the extent of 
corruption in the country (Mauro 1995).   To incorporate this connection, consider Equation (2) 
where corruption is postulated to have a direct impact on economic development. 
(2) Econj=f2(CORj, Kj, Cj, Hj ,Lj). 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) demonstrate that the quality of institutions in the 
country, such as secure property rights, has a direct impact on development.  Thus, in Equation 
(2) K represents the institutional characteristics of the country.  H stands for standard human 
capital measures that impact economic development, such as the level of education in the 
country. 
Substituting Equation (2) into (1) generates the macro-level reduced form 
(3) CORj=f3(Lj, Cj, Hj, Kj). 
 
Micro-level  
At the micro level a number of formulations can be developed to demonstrate the 
determinants of corruption.  Examples are Kaufmann and Wei (1999), Ades and Di Tella (1999), 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).   Similarly, one can consider that the utility of the bribe-
receiving government official depends on composite consumption good, the number of bribes he 
receives, and the quality of the institutions in the country. Consumption is determined by the sum 
of earned legal income and illegal income (the unit price of each bribe multiplied by quantity of 
bribes).  An increase in the income of the target victim increases the unit price of each bribe, and 





 probability of apprehension.   In this framework, it is easy to show that an increase in the 
income of the potential victim would increase the propensity to ask for a bribe.  Alternatively, an 
increase in the quality of the institutions in the country, which would increase probability of 
apprehension, would in turn reduce the propensity to ask for a bribe. 
Within this framework I estimate 
(4) CORij=f (Xij, Lj, Cj,  Hj, Kj), 
where CORij is the propensity of the i
th individual who lives in country j to be a victim of 
corruption, Xij represents personal characteristics of the individual, and Lj, Cj, Kj, and Hj are the 
characteristics of the country as described above.  The theoretical and empirical research have 
identified viable candidates of X, L, C, H and K, which are described below. 
 
Individual-specific Explanatory Variables 
The propensity for being targeted for a bribe is assumed to depend on the following 
individual characteristics.  Age, marital status, labor market activity, wealth, education, gender 
and the location of the residence.  Because the dependent variable is essentially a measure of 
“exposure to bribery,” individuals in certain age, wealth and labor market categories may be at a 
higher risk of being asked for a bribe.  For example, all else the same, highly-educated and 
wealthy individuals should have higher exposure to being asked for a bribe by a government 
official because of their higher earning capacity.  The opposite should be true for people who are 
not active in the labor market, such as the very young and old, as they may have less contact with 
government officials in comparison to prime-age individuals.  Males are expected to be more 
frequent targets of bribery for a number of reasons.  First, in most countries males are more 





 exposure to government officials.  Second, all else the same, males have a higher propensity to 
engage in criminal activity or to have tolerance for illegal activity (Mocan and Rees 1999, 
Swamy et al. 2001).   
In larger cities the extent of bribery may be higher both because economic activity may 
be larger and more varied in scope which may increase the contact with the government, and also 
the relationship between individuals and government officials may be less personal in larger 
cities in comparison to smaller ones, which may make it easier to ask for a bribe. 
 
Legal, Political and Cultural Country Characteristics 
Following La Porta et al. (1998) and Treisman (2000), I include variables that measure 
the structure of the existing legal system in the country.  More specifically, La Porta et al. (1998) 
argue that the common law system developed in England in the 17
th century has been shaped by 
the parliament and aristocracy at the expense of the crown and it is intended to limit the power of 
the sovereign.  As a consequence, British common law puts emphasis on individuals’ private and 
property rights, and it intends to limit, rather than strengthen, the power of the state (David and 
Brierley 1978, Finer 1997, La Porta et al., 1998).  In comparison, French civil law, Scandinavian 
civil law and German civil law are designed as instruments of the state to expand its power; and 
socialist law is a manifestation of the state’s intent to create institutions to maintain power and 
extract resources without much regard for protecting economic interests (La Porta et al. 1998).  
Thus, individuals in countries with British legal origin are expected to face a lower propensity of 
corruption. 
As discussed in Acemoğlu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), an argument dating back to 





 argues that religion may have a direct impact on corruption through two avenues.  First, religion 
is a major part of culture, and in countries with hierarchical religions such as Catholicism, 
Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, it may be culturally more difficult to challenge the authority of 
office-holders in comparison to cultures with more individualistic or egalitarian religions such as 
Protestantism.  Second, as argued by Treisman (2000), in religions such as Protestantism, which 
emerged as a reaction to a state-sponsored religion, there may be stronger emphasis on 
monitoring potential abuses of state officials.  By contrast, in more traditional religions such as 
Islam or Catholicism, such a check-and-balance role may be absent. 
The impact of centralized versus de-centralized governmental structure on the level of 
corruption is unclear.  There exist various theories that predict detrimental effects of both.  For 
example, it is argued that the existence of a federal system leads to a more honest government 
because it promotes competition between various jurisdictions (Weingast 1995).  Alternatively, it 
is hypothesized that a federal structure may lead to more corruption because in that system there 
are fewer centralized forces to enforce honesty, and the level of interaction between potential 
corrupters and government officials is greater at the local level (Tanzi 1995).  To investigate this 
impact of the structure of the government, I control whether the country has a federal system of 
government.     
 
Institutional and Political Characteristics 
Higher quality institutions are expected to reduce the incidence of corruption.  Along the 
same lines, interrupted democracy in the country and involvement in a war in recent history may 





  A large government creates more occasions for individuals to interact with government 
workers, increasing the exposure to corruption.  To control for the effect, I add a variable which 
is the share of government in per capita gross domestic product. 
The quality of the institutions of the country can be measured in a number of ways such 
as the independence of the judicial system and the protection of civil liberties. Following 
Acemoğlu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), I use the risk of expropriation in the country (the risk 
of confiscation and forced nationalization of property) as a measure of the quality of the 
institutions.   The structure of institutions is likely to change over the course of development; that 
is, the protection of property rights might get stronger as the country develops economically.  
Acemoglu Johnson and Robinson (2001) contol for the endogeneity of institutions by using the 
settler mortality rates in ex-colonies as instruments.   As explained in section IV below, 
institutional quality and other potentially endogenous variables are instrumented by geographic 
indicators as employed by McArthur and Sachs (2001).    
 
Other Country Characteristics 
 Ades and Di Tella (1999) indicate that countries with large endowments of raw materials 
are more susceptible to corruption because such resources create opportunities for the officials to 
exploit the associated rents, and this behavior may have spillover effects to other segments of the 
society. Thus, I control for the richness of oil, iron, gold and zinc reserves in the country.   The 
level of education in the country is an aggregate measure of the human capital, and it is expected 
to be negatively related to the incidence of corruption as a more educated population is expected 
to be less tolerant of corruption.  The population of the country and the percentage of young 





 included.  If increased unemployment is due to a cyclical downturn, it may capture a temporary 
decrease in income of the target population and therefore may reduce the size of a bribe, as well 
as frequency with which it is asked for.  On the other hand, if high unemployment is an 
indication of structurally high joblessness, and if this is correlated with low income for 
government workers, unemployment may be positively correlated with the incidence of 
corruption.  
Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar, Fisman and Gatti (2001) use country-level data and 
show that corruption is less severe in countries where women hold a larger share of 
parliamentary seats.  It is hypothesized that an increase in the proportion of seats held by women 
in the parliament may have a detrimental impact on corruption through women’s influence on 
executive and judicial branch appointments and through being anti-corruption role models.  
Thus, I also investigate the impact of a change in the percentage of seats occupied by women in 
the parliament on individuals’ risk of corruption. 
 
III. Corruption  Data 
The data are compiled from a number of sources.  The corruption data and the corresponding 
characteristics of the individuals are obtained from the International Crime Victim Survey 
compiled by the United Nations Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
(http://www.unicri.it/icvs).  Table 1 presents the list of countries included in the analysis.  The 
data are collected through face-to-face and telephone interviews.  The corruption measure for 
each individual is the answer to the question: “In some areas, there is a problem of corruption 





 instance a customs officer, police officer or inspector in your own country, asked you or 
expected you to pay a bribe for his services?”    
Table 1 also displays the number of individuals surveyed in each country, the year of 
their bribery experience (which is the year before the survey is administered), and the gender-
specific means of the dichotomous variable “corruption”, which is coded as 1 if the respondent 
indicated that he/she was asked for a bribe by a government official.  As can be seen from the 
table, females are asked for a bribe less frequently than males in almost every country.  
The third column of Table 1 displays country averages, which are weighted means of the 
corruption question.  Corruption is highest in Indonesia, where 31 percent of the citizens 
indicated that they were asked for a bribe.  The extent of corruption, measured this way, is 29 
percent in Argentina, 26 percent in Bolivia, 24 percent in Uganda, and 21 percent in India and 
Kyrgyz Republic.  Western European countries have low corruption rates, generally less than 0.5 
percent; and corruption is practically zero in Japan. 
There exist four widely-used aggregate corruption perception indexes.  They are the 
measures created by Transparency International (TI)  
(http://www.transparcency.org/surveys/index.html), by the World Bank Researchers 
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/), by Business International (BI) 
(Mauro 1995), and by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (Fishman and Gatti 2002).  The 
TI index ranges from 1 to 10, the WB index ranges from –2.5 to 2.5, the BI index ranges from 1 
to 10, and the ICRG ranges from 1 to 6, where a higher value represents a lower degree of 
perceived corruption.  Simple correlations between these corruption perception indexes are high, 





  There are two dimensions of corruption: how widespread it is in the country (breadth) and 
the size of each bribe (depth).   The depth of bribery is likely to vary between government 
agencies.  The amount of bribe asked by a licensing office will be different from the amount of 
bribe asked by a custom’s officer.  It also depends on whether bribe involves theft (Schleifer and 
Vishny 1993).    The four corruption indexes which are used in previous literature are measures 
of corruption perception.  Therefore it is unclear whether they capture the beliefs about the depth 
or breath of corruption, or whether and they are  mixtures of both.  In contrast, the index used in 
this paper is a measure of the breath of corruption in the country. 
 Figures 1-5 display the corruption measure created from the data set used in this paper 
(Average Overall Corruption of Table 1) along with the four subjective corruption perception 
indexes, where the corruption perception indexes are reversed such that higher values represent 
higher levels of corruption.  For each country, the data are merged with corruption perception 
indexes by year.  For example, as can be seen in Table 1, France is surveyed twice, and 
individuals are asked about their corruption experiences for the years 1995 and 1999.  The TI 
index is available for both of these years.  Therefore, average corruption in France in 1995 
(0.007) is matched with the corresponding value of the TI index in 1995, and average corruption 
in France in 1999 (0.0125) is matched with the value of the TI index for France in 1999.  Thus, 
some countries contribute more than one observation in Figures 1-5.
2  The World Bank 
 corruption index is created for the years 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 (Kaufmann, Krayy and  
Mastruzzi 2003).   Therefore, the closest year of the World Bank index is matched with our data. 
For example, for countries where corruption activity pertains to 1995 in our data, the World  
                                                           





 Bank index of 1996 is used.  The match is less accurate for the BI and ICRG perception indexes 
as these indexes cover the intervals 1980-83, and 1982-90, respectively (see Mauro 1995, and 
Fisman and Gatti 2002). 
 The curves in Figures 1-4 are the predicted values of regressions of perceived corruption 
indexes on the percentage of individuals who are asked for a bribe (displayed on the horizontal 
axes).  In all cases a non-linear relationship is visible, which is especially pronounced in the case 
of TI and WB indexes.   Regressions with quadratic terms of corruption provided better fits.  For 
example, in the regression with TI perception index as the dependent variable (Figure 1), the 
adjusted-R
2  was 0.77, and it was 0.59 without the quadratic term.  In case of the regressions 
involving the WB Corruption Perception index, the adjusted-R
2  was 0.62 in the linear case, and 
it was 0.80 in the quadratic case (Figure 2).  This non-linearity is primarily due the fact that in a 
small number of countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia and Indonesia, citizens have reported high 
levels of corruption, but the external perception of corruption is relatively low in these cases.  
For example, Figure 1 shows that in Argentina 29 percent of the people indicate that they were 
asked for a bribe, while the perception of corruption based on the TI index does not fully reflect 
this phenomenon.     
Figure 1 shows that a number of countries have very low levels of corruption, although their 
perceived corruption seems disproportionately higher than warranted. To be able to 
accommodate the patterns at the low- and high-end of the corruption spectrum, I fit a third-order 
polynomial of corruption.  The predicted values from this regression are plotted in Figure 1 as 






  In order to minimize the impact of outliers in a different way, robust regressions are 
estimated, which produced very similar coefficient estimates and predicted values to those 
obtained from quadratic OLS regression.  The predicted values from robust regressions are 
displayed in Figures 1-4 as dashed lines.    
Another way to address the nonlinearity is to run regressions on logarithmic scale. Figure 5 
presents the data and the predicted values of the regression where the logarithm of the TI 
corruption perception index is regressed on the logarithm of actual corruption.  The point 
estimate was 0.35 with a t-value of 10.6 (n=56, Adjusted R-square=0.67), suggesting that a 10 
percent increase in the rate of bribery in the country increases the corruption perception of the 
country by 3.5 percent.  In the model with the BI index, the  elasticity of perceived corruption 
with respect to average corruption was 0.33 (t=5.25, Adjusted R-square=0.57).  The elasticity 
was 0.64 in the model with the WB perception index (t=4.26, Adjusted R-square=0.23), and 0.25 
in case of the ICRG index (t=5.03, Adjusted R-square=0.43). 
Finally, multiple observations from some countries are dropped and regressions are re-
estimated.  That is, for the six countries that are surveyed both in 1995 and 1999 (see Table 1 and 
footnote 1), I dropped observations pertaining to 1999.  In case of Poland, which is surveyed in 
1991, 1995 and 1999, I dropped 1991 and 1999.  Estimating the regressions without these eight 
observations did not change the pictures depicted in Figures 1-5. 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
 
Missing data pertaining to country-level variables (such as average education and 
institutional quality) are a problem for some counties, especially for those in Central and Eastern 





 Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Colombia United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, France, Finland, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Portugal, 
Denmark, United States, Canada, Australia, Poland, Hungary, Japan, and India.
3  Table 2 
displays the definitions and the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables along with their 
sources.  The descriptive statistics pertain to 54,209 individuals from the 29 countries mentioned 
above with no missing personal or country-level information.  This is the data set used in micro-
level empirical analyses in this section.   
Columns I and II of Table 3 present the results of the estimated probit model, where the 
dependent variable is one if the respondent indicated that he/she was asked for a bribe in that 
year, and zero otherwise.  The model includes time dummies to control for the impact of the year 
in which the survey is given.  The regressions are weighted and the standard errors are adjusted 
to account for the fact that the unit of observation is the individual, but country-specific variables 
vary at the country and not at the individual level.  Columns (I) and (II) report the estimated 
coefficients and their standard errors where all the right-hand-side variables are considered 
exogenous.   Adding a dichotomous variable to distinguish between face-to-face and phone 
interviews did not have any impact on the results, and the variable itself was not significant. 
The model contains an extensive number of variables to control for cultural 
characteristics of the country which may be correlated with both corruption propensity and 
women in the parliament, institutional quality and democracy.  Examples are the religious make-
                                                           
3  In case of India, there was one missing variable, which was the male unemployment rate for the year 
1995. Unemployment rate was not reported for India by the World Bank, World Development Report, 
which is the data source other countries’ unemployment rate data.  For not to lose the 1,193 observations 
from India, I used the 7.0 percent unemployment rate in 1995 for this country, reported by Planning 







 up of the country, the population size and structure, and the legal origin of the country.  
However, if democracy, expropriation risk, women in the parliament, and the share of the 
government in per capita GDP are correlated with some omitted cultural factors which also 
influence corruption, the estimates may be biased.  Therefore, I also estimate the model with 
instrumental variable probit, where democracy, expropriation risk, the percentage of women in 
the parliament, and government’s share of GDP are considered as endogenous variables, which 
are instrumented by the life expectancy in the country, the extent of enthnolinguistic 
fragmentation of the country, and geographical attributes of the country, measured by the 
absolute latitude of the country, average temperature and whether the country is landlocked.  The 
descriptive statistics of these variables are reported in Table 2.   
The geographical characteristics of the country are exogenous, and McArthur and Sachs 
(2001) argue that they are appropriate instruments for institutions and other determinants of 
economic growth.   Life expectancy at birth and the degree of ethnolinguistic fragmentation of 
the country change only slowly over time.  These variables may capture aspects of the culture 
which may be correlated with institutions, democracy and women’s involvement in politics, but 
they themselves are not expected to be influenced by corruption.  The results of the instrumental 
variable probit are reported in columns (III) and (IV) of Table 3.  The point estimates are very 
similar between columns (I) and (III), but for the most part the coefficients are estimated with 
more precision when democracy, low expropriation risk, women in parliament and share of 








 The Impact of Personal Characteristics  
The results, reported in Table 3, show that individuals who live in smaller cities face a 
lower propensity of being asked for a bribe.  Males are more likely to be asked for a bribe. 
Wealthier individuals (those who are in the top 50 percent of the income distribution in the 
country) are more likely to engage in corruption.  Similarly, individuals who are more educated 
are more likely to be targeted for bribes. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions 
discussed earlier in the paper, which indicate that more educated people who have higher 
incomes may have more contact with the government, which exposes them to a higher risk of 
being asked for a bribe.   
Individuals who are 20-to-39 years of age are more likely to be asked for a bribe in 
comparison to those who are younger than 20.  Individuals who are 60 years and older are less 
likely to get involved in corruption.   Single individuals are less likely to be asked for a bribe in 
comparison to married individuals.   These results may suggest that older (possibly retired) 
individuals and those who are single may have to deal with government rules and regulations 
less frequently. 
 
Country Characteristics and Institutions  
Instrumental variable probit results show that the legal origin of the country has an 
impact on corruption propensity.  In countries with French legal origin the corruption propensity 
is about 1.4 percentage points higher in comparison to countries with Scandinavian or Socialist 
legal origins.  German legal origin of the country increases the risk of corruption by14 
percentage points.   Following Acemoğlu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), the quality of the 





 risk of expropriation is lower (where the variable Low Expropriation Risk takes higher values) 
the propensity to be asked for a bribe is lower.  An improvement of expropriation risk by one 
standard deviation generates about a one-percentage point decrease in the propensity to be asked 
for a bribe.  Given that the sample mean of corruption is 4.1 percent, this translates into a 24 
percent decline, which is substantial.    
If the country had uninterrupted democracy between 1950 and 1995, the risk of being a 
victim of bribery is about 1 percentage point lower.  A federal government structure is also 
associated with about 1 percentage point reduction in corruption propensity.  Having experienced 
a war in1960s to 1980s increases the risk of corruption by one percentage point.  
Individuals who live in more populous countries face a higher propensity of corruption.  
More specifically, an increase in the country’s population by one million is associated with an 
increase in the propensity to be asked for a bribe by 0.01 percentage points.  A one percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate in the country increases the risk of corruption by 0.1 
percentage points.   Average education in the country and the percentage of women in parliament 
have negative impacts on corruption risk, but they are statistically insignificant.  
 
V.   Is Perceived Corruption Related to the Source of Corruption? 
  Aggregate corruption perception indicators used by previous research by and large 
capture the sentiments of businesspeople and international organizations.  Thus, they can be 
considered measures of risk assessment for the relevant countries.  In this section I investigate 
whether the perceived extent of corruption is related to particular types of corruption incidence in 
the country.   More importantly, I also analyze whether the quality of institutions has a direct 





 This is important for two reasons.  First, this analysis will help us understand how perceptions 
of corruption are formed.  Second, if perceived corruption about a country hurts that country’s 
economic development, it would be important to shed light into the question of how to alter the 
perceived corruption about the country. 
In the survey used in this paper, there is a follow-up question that was asked to those who 
indicated that they were asked for a bribe, which is posed as “[The last time somebody asked for 
a bribe], what type of official was involved?”  In some years of the survey, the alternatives were 
government official, customs officer, police officer, inspector, and other.  In some other years the 
alternatives were government official, customs officer, police officer, inspector, elected 
municipal councilors, municipal officials, tax/revenues officials, doctors/nurses, 
teachers/professors, officials in courts, private sector, and other.  This allows a classification of 
the extent of bribery by type of recipient such as a government official, police officer, customs 
officer, inspector, and other recipients.  For each country, the weighted percentage of bribes 
asked by each category is calculated.   
Table 4A displays regression results where the reversed-TI index is regressed on region 
dummies (Central Europe, Mediterranean, etc.), legal origin dummies and variables that measure 
the religious composition of the country.  In these regressions the unit of observation is the 
country, and the regressions are based on 43 observations.    Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the region level, and the models are estimated with instrumental variables, where 
linear and quadratic measures of corruption indicators and expropriation index are instrumented 
by average temperature of the country, absolute latitude of the country, whether the country is 
landlocked, and the extent of ethnolinguistic fragmentation.   The results displayed in Panel A 





 corruption incidence.  Column (I) of Table 4A demonstrates that an increase in average 
corruption in the country generates an increase in perceived corruption about that country 
measured by the TI index.  A non-linear relationship was evident in a regression with no control 
variables (which created Figure 1).  Column (II) adds the quadratic corruption term to the 
regression, but the existence of the control variables eliminates the statistical significance of the 
quadratic term of corruption.  On the other hand, the hypothesis that linear and quadratic terms 
are jointly significant is rejected at the 1.6 percent level.  The F-tests pertaining to this hypothesis 
are reported for each regression. 
When Low Expropriation Risk is added to the model (column III) a different picture 
emerges.  Neither the expropriation nor the corruption variables are individually significant, and 
the hypothesis that corruption variables are jointly zero cannot be rejected.  When the 
specification omits the quadratic corruption term, but keeps the Low Expropriation  Risk 
(column IV) the coefficient of the linear corruption term remains insignificant.  Low 
Expropriation Risk becomes borderline significant in this specification (p=0.15), and it is 
significant in column (V) where corruption variables are omitted.  
Panel B presents the results of the model where average corruption is replaced by 
government corruption.  This variable is the weighted average of the proportion of the 
individuals who indicated that the bribe was asked by a government or public official.   
Similarly, Panel C presents the results from the model where TI corruption perception index is 
regressed on the incidence of Police Corruption in the country, where Police Corruption is the 
weighted percentage of the individuals who were asked for a bribe by a police officer, given that 
a bribe was requested.  The country averages of these corruption measures are listed at the 





 of the time it was a government official who asked for a bribe, and 31.73 percent of the time the 
perpetrator was a police officer. 
  Columns (I) and (II) of Panels B and C indicate that increases in the extent of corruption 
in government offices and within the police generate increases in the corruption perception of the 
country as measured by the (reversed) TI index.  However, when the measure of institutional 
quality is added to the model, the significance of corruption variable disappears.   Instead, 
institutional quality (Low Expropriation Risk) becomes a significant determinant of corruption 
perception.   The same result is obtained in panels D, E and F where the TI corruption perception 
index is explained by Customs Corruption, Inspector Corruption, and corruption among others, 
respectively.  
The median estimate of the coefficient of Low Expropriation Risk within the panels of 
Table 4A is about  -1.7.  This means that, a 10 percent decline in the risk of expropriation in the 
country generates an improvement in the corruption perception of the country by 1.42 on the TI 
scale, which is 56 % of a standard deviation.   
Table 4B presents the results of the same regressions as in Table 4A, with one difference: 
the dependent variable is the reversed-World Bank corruption measure.   The same pattern is 
observed.  That is, the quality of the institutions of the country, as measured by the risk of 
expropriation, influences the corruption perception about the country; but holding constant the 
quality of institutions, the extent of actual corruption has no direct impact on corruption 
perception.  The WB scale is narrower than the TI index, ranging from 0 to 3.38.  The median 
estimate of the impact of institutions within each panel is about -0.5, which means that a 10 





 corruption perception of the country by 0.42 on the WB scale, which is 40 % of a standard 
deviation of the WB index. 
Same regressions were run for the BI and the ICRG indexes.  These indexes were not 
related to either bribery incidence in the country, or it components, or the quality of institutions. 
Given that the incidence of corruption is low in North America, Western Europe, 
Australia and Japan, the corruption rates among government officials, police, inspectors and 
other officials are calculated on small samples, and are therefore noisy.  Measurement error in 
these variables may be the cause for the lack of a statistically significant relationship between 
corruption perception indexes and sources of corruption.  To minimize measurement error in the 
sources of corruption, the regressions are estimated by excluding Western European and 
Mediterranean countries, the U.S., Canada, Australia and Japan.  In case of the BI index, 
regressions could not be run because most central European countries do not have an assigned 
value for the BI index.  In case of the TI and WB indexes the results were very similar to those 
displayed in Tables 4A and 4B.  Furthermore, although the sample sizes were smaller (21 
countries), higher statistical significance is obtained, and in regressions that use the ICRG index, 
the expropriation risk was highly significant.  
These results show that the perception of corruption formed about a country is influenced 
by the quality level of the institutions of that country.  Once the level of institutional quality is 
controlled for, the extent of actual corruption in the country or the extent of corruption in various 
government offices (police, customs, etc.) do not have a direct impact on corruption perception.  
This suggests that the efforts to curb corruption can be focused on reforming the institutions of 
the country to impact the corruption perception about the country. 





   
VI. Growth and Corruption 
In this section I re-visit the corruption-growth relationship documented by Mauro (1995).  
In light of the results of the previous sections, it is important to investigate whether previously 
documented relationship between corruption and growth is a causal one.  Given that institutional 
quality impacts corruption as well as the perception of corruption about a country, and given the 
evidence that institutions impact growth (Acemoğlu, Johnson and Robinson 2001), it is 
conceivable that corruption-growth relationship is a correlation which emerges in models that do 
not control for institutions.   This is an important issue with significant policy implications.  If 
corruption has a direct causal impact on growth, efforts can be channeled on corruption control 
and deterrence.  On the other hand, if institutions have an impact on growth, then efforts should 
be focused on institutional reforms.  
For each country in the data set the average annual growth in per capita GDP between 
1975 and the year of the survey (typically 1995) is calculated.   For the countries where the 
survey is conducted in multiple years, the year closest to 1995 is chosen.  For many Eastern 
European countries GDP data are not available in 1975; thus such counties cannot be included in 
this analysis.  The average value of annual income growth in the sample of countries is 1.7 
percent.  The highest average annual growth during this two-decade period is in Botswana with 
4.8 percent, and the two negative average annual growth rates are in South Africa and Bolivia, 
with –0.2 percent and –0.055 percent, respectively. 
 In addition to geographic location indicators, legal origin measures and religious 
composition variables, the growth regressions include dichotomous variables to indicate the 





 the country in 1975 as a measure of human capital at the beginning of the period where growth 
is analyzed, and real per capita GDP in 1975 (Initial GDP).
4  In order to investigate the direct 
impact of corruption on growth net of the impact of the quality of institutions, the regressions 
also include expropriation risk as a regressor.
5 Regressions are estimated with instrumental 
variables where the corruption and expropriation risk are instrumented by the absolute latitude of 
the country, average temperature in the country, an indicator variable which takes the value of 
one if the country is landlocked, and the extent of the ethnolinguistic fragmentation of the 
country.   
Table 5 displays the result from five different regressions.  In column (I), linear and 
quadratic corruption measures are included along with Low Expropriation Risk.  The coefficients 
have predicted signs, where increased corruption has a detrimental effect on growth, and Low 
Expropriation Risk increases growth.  However, neither variable is statistically significant, 
although all three are jointly significant with an F-value of 11.35 (p=0.007).  The hypothesis that 
corruption variables are jointly zero cannot be rejected (F=0.65,  p=0.55).   Column (II) presents 
the results where economic growth is explained by linear and quadratic corruption variables, but 
the expropriation risk is omitted from this specification.  In this case, corruption variables are 
jointly significant (F=22.2, p=0.002).  Column (III) contains the results from the model where 
only the linear corruption term is included, which shows that the estimated impact of corruption 
is not statistically significant.   In Column (IV) we see that reduced risk of expropriation has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on growth when it is included to the model with no 
                                                           
4   Education in 1975 was obtained from Barro and Lee (1996), and per capita income in 1975 was 
obtained from Penn World Tables, version 6.1.  The results did not change when I used average education 
in 1970, 1965 or 1960; or primary, secondary and high school completion rates in 1975, 1970, 1965 or 
1960.   





 corruption measures.  Column (V) demonstrates that the corruption measure has no statistically 
significant impact on growth when included along with low expropriation risk.  In this 
specification the expropriation risk variable is not statistically significant at conventional levels 
with a p-value of 0.13.  
The regressions in Table 5 are based on 30 observations, which imply 10-12 degrees of 
freedom.  To increase the precision of the estimates, regressions with various alternative 
specifications are estimated which are reported in Table 6.  Column (I) of  
Table 6 omits the region dummies.  In column (II) both region indicators and legal origin 
dummies are dropped.  Column (III) presents the results from a regression which does not 
include region, legal origin, war or federal government indicators.  Finally, column (IV) displays 
the results from a regression where only legal origin indicators are omitted.  In all cases the 
coefficient of corruption is insignificant and the point estimate is close to zero.  The 
expropriation risk, on the other hand, remains statistically significant with almost no change in 
the point estimate. 
Table 7 performs the same exercise excluding developed economies.  More specifically, 
columns (I) to (III) display the results of regressions  that use data from 19 countries in Central  
Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean.  Columns (IV) to (VI) reports the 
results based on the sample which excludes the Mediterranean countries and Japan in addition to 
North America, Australia and Western Europe.   Although the sample size gets smaller in these 
regressions, the coefficient of Low Expropriation Risk remains statistically significant, and the 
point estimate is around 0.009, which is similar to the one observed in Tables 5 and 6.  The 
coefficient of corruption, on the other hand, is never significant.  Using the four corruption 





 paper, did not change the results.  These indexes were not significant determinants of growth 
even in the models which did not contain expropriation risk. 
In summary, the results displayed in Table 7 indicate that when included jointly with the 
expropriation risk, corruption does not have a direct impact on economic growth.  This suggests 
that the effect of corruption on growth is because of the impact of institutions on corruption.  Put 
differently, weak institutions cause corruption and weak institutions impede economic growth, 
but once the quality of institutions are controlled for, there is no direct impact of corruption on 
growth. 
The point estimates in Tables 5-7 imply that a 1/2-standard deviation improvement in the 
quality of institutions (0.81 units) generates an increase in the average annual per capita GDP 
growth rate by about 0.7 percentage points.  Another way to put this magnitude in perspective 
would be to consider two otherwise similar countries with per capita incomes of $2,500 in 1975.  
Assume that the first country’s level of institutional quality is one-half standard deviation below 
that of the second country (which is akin to the case of Indonesia and India).  Real per capita 
income of the first country is expected to rise to $3,500 by 1995, while per capita income in the 
country with one-percentage point less corruption would be about $4,000. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
This paper utilizes a micro-level data set from 49 countries to address three issues: What 
determines corruption at the individual level? What determines the perception of the extent of 
corruption in the country? Does corruption have a direct impact on growth when the quality of 





  The paper portrays the extent of corruption as revealed by citizens who live in those 
countries.  Exposure to corruption is defined as having been asked for a bribe by a government 
official, such as a government worker, customs officer, police officer, or inspector in that 
country.  The country-level corruption indicator created in this paper is the proportion of 
individuals in a country who were asked for a bribe in a year. This is the first direct measure of 
corruption created in this literature, which gauges how wide-spread corruption is in the country.  
This measure is shown to be highly correlated with widely-used corruption perception indexes 
such as the ones generated by Transparency International (TI), World Bank (WB), Business 
International (BI), and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  However, some countries, 
such as Argentina and Indonesia seem to be outliers where the extent of bribery reported in these 
data is more severe than the perceived corruption in those countries.  
The analysis of the determinants of corruption is done using 54,209 individuals from 29 
countries who had no missing data on personal and country attributes.  The regressions control 
for the endogeneity of institutions, democracy, the proportion of women in the parliament, and 
the government’s share of per capita GDP.  The results show that both personal and country 
characteristics determine the likelihood of being asked for a bribe.  Males, wealthier and more 
educated individuals are more likely to be asked for a bribe.  The same is true for individuals 
living in larger cities, and those who are not single.   
If the legal origin of the country is French or German, this is associated with a higher risk 
of being asked for a bribe in comparison to British, Scandinavian or Socialist legal origins.  If the 
country had uninterrupted democracy between the years of 1960 and 1980, this reduces the risk 
of being asked for a bribe one percentage point.  If a war occurred in the country during the 





  The strength of institutions in the country (as measured by low risk of expropriation) has 
the benefit of reducing the extent of corruption in the country.  If the risk of expropriation in the 
country goes down by one standard deviation, this reduces the propensity of corruption by 
almost one percentage point. 
The second part of the paper investigates how the perception of the extent of the 
corruption in the country is formed.  Country-level regressions are run where TI, WB, BI and 
ICRG corruption perception indexes are regressed on a number of country characteristics, the 
extent of actual corruption in the country (and its components, such as police corruption, 
government corruption, etc.), as well as the institutional quality of the country.    Controlling for 
endogeneity of corruption and institutional quality, it is shown that actual corruption in the 
country and the proportion of the bribes asked by various government agencies have no direct 
impact on corruption perception.  On the other hand, an improvement in the quality of 
institutions lowers the perception of corruption.  Specifically, a 10 percent decline in the risk of 
expropriation in the country generates an improvement in the corruption perception of the 
country by about 60% of a standard deviation of the TI corruption perception index, and by 40% 
standard deviation of the WB corruption perception index.  These findings suggest that 
concentrating efforts on  reforming the institutions of the country will be an effective method  to 
influence the perceptions about the extent of corruption in the country. 
Earlier research has argued that corruption is negatively correlated with development 
(Mauro 1995).   Another line of research has demonstrated that weak institutions cause 
macroeconomic volatility and slower economic growth (Acemoğlu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2001; Acemoğlu,  Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen 2003).   Given the results in this paper 





 between corruption and growth in a model that accounts for the quality of institutions of the 
country.   This analysis in the final section of the paper shows that the strength of institutions in 
the country (as measured by low risk of expropriation) improves the rate of economic growth in 
the country.  However, controlling for the quality of the institutions, corruption does not have a 
direct impact on growth.  It cannot be ruled out that this result is specific to the time period 
analyzed (1975-1995) or to the countries in the data set.  But it suggests that the documented 
association between corruption and growth is likely due to the omitted influence of institutions 
on corruption.  Keeping constant the geographical location of the country, its legal origin, 
religious composition, the presence of a war, federal status, initial education and income as well 
as the extent of corruption in the country, a one-half standard deviation increase in the quality of 
institutions (e.g. from the level of Indonesia to the level of India), generates an additional 0.7 
percentage point increase in the average annual per capita GDP growth.   For a developing 
country with $2,500 per capita income in 1975 this translates into an additional $500 per capita 
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  Table 1 
The Incidence of Corruption by Country 







    Activity  Observations (Overall)  (Male)  (Female) 
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
United Kingdom  1995  5404  0.0025  0.0030  0.0021 
United Kingdom  1999  5513  0.0007  0.0009  0.0005 
Netherlands 1995  2007  0.0055  0.0082  0.0028 
Netherlands 1999  1998  0.0040  0.0037  0.0044 
Switzerland 1995  1000  0.0023  0.0040  0.0007 
Belgium 1999  2499  0.0035  0.0049  0.0022 
Finland 1995  3829  0.0013  0.0027  0.0000 
Finland 1999  1780  0.0016  0.0033  0.0000 
Sweden 1995  1000  0.0025  0.0020  0.0029 
Sweden 1999  2001  0.0009  0.0000  0.0018 
Austria 1995  1507  0.0072  0.0126  0.0022 
Denmark 1999  3006  0.0028  0.0053  0.0004 
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
France 1995  1003  0.0070  0.0126  0.0017 
France 1999  997  0.0125  0.0155  0.0097 
Spain 1999  2908  0.0025  0.0015  0.0034 
Malta 1996  993  0.0408  0.0467  0.0350 
Portugal 1999  1998  0.0135  0.0182  0.0091 
U.S., CANADA and AUSTRALIA 
United States  1995  1000  0.0027  0.0055  0.0000 
United States  1999  999  0.0021  0.0044  0.0000 
Canada 1995  2132  0.0039  0.0043  0.0036 
Canada 1999  2075  0.0039  0.0070  0.0009 
Australia 1999  2003  0.0033  0.0044  0.0021 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Estonia 1994  1153  0.0391  0.0513  0.0257 
Poland 1991  1974  0.0546  0.0734  0.0374 
Poland 1995  3438  0.0480  0.0664  0.0310 
Poland 1999  5194  0.0517  0.0699  0.0350 
Czech Republic  1995  1752  0.0809  0.1040  0.0587 
Slovakia 1996  1091  0.1414  0.1929  0.0940 
Russia 1995  1006  0.1896  0.2545  0.1308 
Georgia 1995  1110  0.2234  0.2887  0.1717 
Slovenia 1996  2046  0.0124  0.0149  0.0095 
Latvia 1995  1380  0.1380  0.1837  0.1051 
Romania 1995  1083  0.1148  0.1535  0.0789 
Hungary 1995  746  0.0392  0.0527  0.0275 
Yugoslavia 1995  1089  0.1750  0.2325  0.1198 
Albania 1995  1188  0.1295  0.1378  0.1211 






Table 1 (concluded) 
Croatia 1996  981  0.1625  0.2046  0.1266 
Ukraine 1996  979  0.1287  0.1586  0.1038 
Belarus 1996  960  0.1250  0.1623  0.0937 
Bulgaria 1996  1066  0.1932  0.2393  0.1497 
Lithuania 1996  1165  0.1112  0.1659  0.0647 
ASIAN COUNTRIES 
Japan 1999  2198  0.0004  0.0000  0.0008 
Indonesia 1995  1338  0.3111  0.3692  0.2526 
Philippines 1995  1497  0.0437  0.0462  0.0415 
India 1995  1193  0.2119  0.2563  0.1691 
Mongolia 1995  1188  0.0467  0.0559  0.0376 
Kyrgyz Republic  1995  1714  0.2087  0.2951  0.1419 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Uganda 1995  1191  0.2372  0.3043  0.1745 
South Africa  1995  996  0.0763  0.1235  0.0303 
Zimbabwe 1995  1003  0.0722  0.0969  0.0491 
Botswana 1996  638  0.0292  0.0569  0.0052 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Costa Rica  1995  998  0.0997  0.1449  0.0554 
Brazil 1995  1000  0.1786  0.2763  0.0785 
Argentina 1995  996  0.2935  0.3492  0.2408 
Bolivia 1995  994  0.2600  0.2989  0.2230 
Paraguay 1995  585  0.1386  0.1636  0.1181 
Colombia 1996  984  0.1953  0.2397  0.1518 
 
Corruption rates are weighted means of individuals who indicated that they were asked for a 


























  Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name  Definition (source)  Mean 
(Std. Dev)
Individual Characteristics 




Small City  Dummy Variable(=1) it the respondent is living in a town 
with a population of 50,000 less (A) 
0.450 
(0.498) 
Middle Size City  Dummy Variable(=1) it the respondent is living in a town 
with a population of 50,000 to 1 million (A) 
0.298 
(0.458) 




Age16to19  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 16 
and 19, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.027 
(0.161) 
Age20to24  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 20 
and 24, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.070 
(0.256) 
Age25to29   Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 25 
and 29, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.100 
(0.299) 
Age30to34  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 30 
and 34, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.111 
(0.314) 
Age35to39       Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 35 
and 39, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.119 
(0.324) 
Age40to44  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 40 
and 44, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.105 
(0.307) 
Age45to49  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 45 
and 49, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.093 
(0.290) 
Age50to54  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 50 
and 54, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.085 
(0.278) 
Age55to59  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 55 
and 59, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.071 
(0.256) 
Age60to64  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 60 
and 64, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.059 
(0.236) 
Age65to69  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 65 
and 69, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.056 
(0.230) 
















Living together  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is living together as a








(Table 2 continued) 
















Retired/disabled  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is retired or disabled, 
0 otherwise (A) 
0.216 
(0.411) 




Other  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is in other 
occupational position, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.018 
(0.134) 
Upper income  Dummy Variable (=1) if the family income is   in the upper 
50% of the country, 0 otherwise (A) 
0.506 
(0.500) 
Education  Years of education of the respondent (A)  11.755 
(3.764) 
Country Characteristics 




Mediterranean  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in Mediterranean 
region, 0 otherwise 
0.072  
(0.258) 




Africa  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in Africa, 0 otherwise  0.054 
(0.227) 
Asia  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in Asia, 0 otherwise  0.088 
(0.283) 




U.S., Canada, Australia  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country the U.S, Canada or 
Australia, 0 otherwise 
0.119 
(0.324) 
British Legal Origin  Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of the respondent is 
English, 0 otherwise (E) 
0.357 
(0.479) 
French Legal Origin  Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of the respondent is 
French, 0 otherwise (E) 
0.275 
(0.446) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin  Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of the respondent is 
Scandinavian, 0 otherwise (E) 
0.128 
(0.334) 
German Legal Origin  Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of the respondent is 
German, 0 otherwise (E) 
0.073 
(0.261) 
Socialist Legal Origin  Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of the respondent is 









(Table 2 Continued) 
Percent Muslim  Percent of Muslims in the country (E)  3.454 
(4.804) 
Percent Catholic  Percent of Catholics in the country (E)  45.117 
(35.613) 
Percent Protestant  Percent of Protestants in the country (E)  22.471 
(27.900) 
Population  Population of the country in millions in the survey year (G)  62.038 
(132.438) 
Population less than 25  Percentage of population less than 25 years of age (K)  37.374  
(9.975) 
Oil  Oil reserve of the country in million barrels (B)  39.049 
(55.024) 












Democratic  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country was democratic in all 46 
years between 1950 and 1995(D) 
0.593 
(0.491) 
Federal  Dummy Variable (=1) if at least two levels of government 
rule the same land and people, each level has at least one area 
of action in which autonomous, there is some guarantee of 
the autonomy of each government, 0 otherwise (D) 
0.273 
(0.446) 
War  Dummy Variable (=1) if a war occurred during 1960s to 
1980s, 0 otherwise (C) 
0.150 
(0.357) 




Low Expropriation Risk   Expropriation Risk in the Country (High values indicate low 
expropriation risk, or stronger institutions) (C) 
8.847 
(1.350) 




Unemployment Rate  Unemployment rate among males in the country (F)  8.206 
(3.576) 
Landlocked  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is landlocked 
(surrounded by land), 0 otherwise (B) 
0.116 
(0.320) 
Latitude  Absolute latitude of the country (E)  0.496 
(0.175) 
Ethnoling. Fragmentation  Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation in the country (E)  0.194 
0.222 
Life Expectancy  Life Expectancy at Birth in the country in 1995 (C)  73.443 
7.744 







  Table 2 (concluded) 




Year95  Dummy Variable (=1) if the survey in the country was done 
in 1995, 0 otherwise 
0.462 
(0.499) 
Year96  Dummy Variable (=1) if the survey in the country was done 
in 1996, 0 otherwise 
0.023 
(0.151) 
Year99  Dummy Variable (=1) if the survey in the country was done 





The descriptive statistics pertain to 54,209 observations with non-missing values in all variables.  
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  Table 3 
The Determinants of Corruption 
at the Individual level 
 Probit  Instrumental Variable Probit 
  Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Individual Characteristics  I II  III  IV 
Small City  -0.008***  (0.003)  -0.006***  (0.001) 
Middle Size City  -0.004*  (0.002)  -0.002*  (0.001) 
Male 0.007***  (0.001)  0.007***  (0.001) 
Upper income  0.003***  (0.001)  0.003***  (0.001) 
Education 0.001***  (0.0002)  0.001***  (0.0001) 
Age20to24 0.004*  (0.003)  0.004**  (0.002) 
Age25to29   0.003  (0.003)  0.004**  (0.002) 
Age30to34 0.003  (0.004)  0.003*  (0.002) 
Age35to39       0.002  (0.003)  0.003*  (0.002) 
Age40to44 0.0004  (0.003)  0.001  (0.002) 
Age45to49 0.002  (0.004)  0.002  (0.002) 
Age50to54 0.001  (0.005)  0.001  (0.002) 
Age55to59 -0.002  (0.003)  -0.001  (0.002) 
Age60to64 -0.005***  (0.001)  -0.004**  (0.001) 
Age65to69 -0.004  (0.003)  -0.003  (0.002) 
Age70+ -0.006***  (0.002)  -0.006***  (0.001) 
Single   -0.002*  (0.001)  -0.001*  (0.001) 
Widowed 0.003  (0.003)  0.003*  (0.002) 
Living together  0.001  (0.002)  0.001  (0.001) 
Divorced `-0.0003  (0.002)  0.0002  (0.001) 
Working 0.002  (0.001)  0.001  (0.001) 
Looking for job  0.0002  (0.002)  0.0005  (0.001) 
Home keeper  0.00004  (0.002)  -0.0004  (0.001) 
Retired/disabled -0.002  (0.002)  -0.002  (0.002) 
Other 0.005  (0.003)  0.004*  (0.003) 
Country Characteristics        
Western Europe  -0.02***  (0.006)  0.002  (0.019) 
Mediterranean -0.011***  (0.001)  -0.006  (0.007) 
Asia -0.016***  (0.001)  -0.014**  (0.004) 
Africa -0.011***  (0.001)  -0.009  (0.003) 
Latin America  -0.011***  (0.001)  -0.008  (0.006) 
Central Europe  -0.012***  (0.002)  -0.001  (0.019) 
British Legal Origin  -0.012***  (0.003)  -0.009  (0.007) 
French Legal Origin  0.012***  (0.003)  0.014**  (0.009) 
German Legal Origin  0.083***  (0.015)  0.137***  (0.078) 
Low Expropriation Risk  -0.008***  (0.0005)  -0.006***  (0.001) 
Democratic -0.008***  (0.003)  -0.013*  (0.008) 
War 0.004*  (0.003)  0.011**  (0.006) 
Federal -0.008***  (0.001)  -0.009**  (0.003) 






(Table 3 concluded) 
Percent Catholic  -0.00004  (0.00005)  0.000002  (0.0002) 
Percent Protestant  -0.000001  (0.0001)  0.0001  (0.0002) 
Oil 0.0001***  (0.00001)  0.00001**  (0.00003) 
Iron 0.0004  (0.0003)  0.001  (0.001) 
Zink -0.001*  (0.0003)  0.0002  (0.001) 
Gold -0.0004***  (0.0001)  -0.0004**  (0.0002) 
Population 0.0001***  (0.00001)  0.0001***  (0.00002) 
Population less than 25  0.0002  (0.0002)  0.0004  (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate  0.002***  (0.0002)  0.001***  (0.0004) 
Average education  -0.003***  (0.001)  -0.001  (0.001) 
Women in parliament  -0.0001  (0.0001)  -0.0002  (0.0003) 
Government Share  0.001***  (0.0005)  0.001***  (0.0002) 
Year95 -0.002  (0.001)  -0.002  (0.001) 
Year96 -0.007***  (0.001)  -0.007**  (0.001) 
Number of Observations  54,209  54,209 
Log-Likelihood -6532.006  -6315.237 
The Coefficients are the marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are adjusted for clustering ate the 
country level. * signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** ate the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1% 
































   
 
 
Table 4A  
The Determinants of Corruption Perception Index 
Dependent Variable: Transparency International Corruption Measure 
Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 










   I  II  III  IV  V 







(0.182)  --- 
 (Average  Corruption)
2  ---  -0.023 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.011)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  8.95 
(0.016) 
0.09 
(0.918)  --- --- 



















(0.048)  --- 
 (Government 
Corruption)
2  ---  -0.003***
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  (6.96) 
0.0273 
0.40 
(0.684)  --- --- 



















(0.13)  --- 
 (Police  Corruption)
2  ---  -0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.008)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  4.39 
(0.067) 
0.06 
(0.946)  --- --- 




























Table 4A (concluded) 







(0.078)  --- 
 (Custom  Corruption)
2  ---  -0.016 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.011)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  0.65 
(0.557) 
0.29 
(0.756)  --- --- 



















(0.09)  --- 
 (Inspector  Corruption)
2  ---  -0.002 
(0.003) 
0 
(0.005)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  2.20 
(0.192) 
0.48 
(0.640)  --- --- 



















(0.061)  --- 
 (Other  Corruption)
 2  ---  -0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  1.14 
(0.381) 
0.23 
(0.802)  --- --- 












 N  43  43  43  43  43 
Linear and quadratic Corruption and Low Expropriation Risk are endogenous. Regressions also 
include region and legal origin dummies and religion variables. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. They are adjusted for clustering at the region level.  * 
signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1% 






   
 
Table 4B  
The Determinants of Corruption Perception Index 
Dependent Variable: World Bank Corruption Measure 
Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 










   I  II  III  IV  V 







(0.035)  --- 
 (Average  Corruption)
2  ---  -0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  5.32 
(0.047) 
1.39 
(0.320)  --- --- 



















(0.012)  --- 
 (Government 
Corruption)
2  ---  -0.001***
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.001)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  31.64 
(0.001) 
2.43 
(0.169)  --- --- 



















(0.026)  --- 
 (Police  Corruption)
2  ---  -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.002)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  2.46 
(0.166) 
0.48 
(0.643)  --- --- 























Table 4B (concluded) 







(0.022)  --- 
 (Customs  Corruption)
2  ---  -0.009 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.004)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  1.09 
(0.395) 
0.40 
(0.685)  --- --- 



















(0.033)  --- 
 (Inspector  Corruption)
2  ---  -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  1.73 
(0.254) 
1.35 
(0.329)  --- --- 



















(0.029)  --- 
 (Other  Corruption)
 2  ---  -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001)  --- --- 







p-value  ---  1.86 
(0.235) 
1.27 
(0.348)  --- --- 












 N  44 44 43 43 43 
Linear and quadratic Corruption and Low Expropriation Risk are endogenous. Regressions also 
include region and legal origin dummies and religion variables. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. They are adjusted for clustering at the region level.  * 
signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1% 













  Table 5 
Determinants of Growth 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Growth 1975-1995 
Instrumental Variables Estimation 






(0.002)  ---  -0.001 
(0.002) 
Corruption
2  0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0002)  --- --- --- 
Low Expropriation Risk   -0.001 














































































































































































No. of observations  30  30 30  30 30 
Linear and quadratic corruption variables and expropriation risk are endogenous.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the region level. The mean value of Initial GDP (per capital income in 1975) in the sample of 30 





  Table 6 
Determinants of Growth 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Growth 1975-1995 
Instrumental Variables Estimation 

















Western Europe   --- --- ---  -0.007 
(0.005) 
Central Europe  --- --- ---  -0.014 
(0.011) 
Africa   --- --- ---  -0.001 
(0.018) 
Latin America  --- --- ---  -0.0004 
(0.013) 
Asia   --- --- ---  -0.011 
(0.015) 
Mediterranean  --- --- ---  -0.013 
(0.014) 
British Legal Origin  0.007 
(0.007)  --- --- --- 
French Legal Origin   0.003 
(0.008)  --- --- --- 
German Legal Origin  0.006 
(0.008)  --- --- --- 
























War   -0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.007 










Initial GDP  -0.0005 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005)  ---  -0.0005 
(0.006) 
















No. of observations   30  30  30  30 
Linear and quadratic corruption variables and expropriation risk are endogenous.  Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the region level. The mean value of Initial GDP (per capital income in 1975) in 






   
Table 7 
Determinants of Growth 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Growth 1975-1995 
Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 
  Excluding Developed  
Countries 
Excluding Developed and  
Mediterranean Countries 
  (I)  (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 


































Percent Catholic   -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005 




Percent Protestant   -0.0004 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 




War   0.001 
(0.009)  --- ---  -0.002 
(0.009)  --- --- 
Federal   -0.004 
(0.011)  --- ---  -0.004 
(0.013)  --- --- 




































No.  of  observations 19 19 19 16 16 16 
Linear and quadratic corruption variables and expropriation risk are endogenous. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the region level. The mean value of Initial GDP (per capital income in 1975) in 
the sample of 19 countries is 5.47 (in $1,000s). The mean value of Average Education in 1975 is 4.15. 
The mean value of Initial GDP in the sample of 16 countries is 4.45 , and the mean of Average Education 
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